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Dr. Elaine Fahey

 
This article argues that Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations have a positive legal story worth 
recounting as to the effects of the negotiations upon the EU legal order. The paper explores the negotiation of EU international 
agreements as a specific field of law and considers how the TTIP negotiations overall contribute to the politicisation of the EU 
through shifts in legal practice on the part of all major institutional actors to EU international relations in changes to approach, 
procedure and actions. It uses the metric of responsiveness to measure or chart the former, considering the responses as actually 
practiced by institutional actors in law to normative concerns arising. It considers these practices across a range of actors, 
specifically the European Commission, the European Parliament, the Ombudsman, the Committee of the Regions and the TTIP 
Advisory Group.  
 
Introduction 
This article argues that Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations have 
a positive legal story worth recounting as to the effects of the negotiations upon the EU legal 
order in the field of external relations. One of the outcomes of the TTIP negotiations, 
irrespective of their eventual success, appears to be their politicisation of the EU. Politicisation 
is a term normally used by political scientists and for the purposes of this paper it is defined as 
the process by which decision-making is brought into the political space. This paper argues that 
politicisation has not taken place in a legal vacuum or without legal consequences and that the 
legal dimension of this politicisation is worth analysing. The outside pressures that the TTIP 
negotiations bring to bear on the EU institutions involved in the negotiation process induce a 
degree of responsiveness in these institutions that has observable effects on the operation of 
the EU legal order in the field of foreign relations, understood here as the ability to respond 
quickly and appropriately. The relationship of the external relations context upon the internal 
context is a recent phenomenon of EU law in the post-Lisbon context, outwards-in.
1
 The TTIP 
negotiations appear to provide rich evidence of responsiveness of EU institutional actors to 
concerns about shortcomings in the democratic process in EU foreign relations law and hence 
about the legitimacy of decision-making in the TTIP negotiations. This responsiveness often goes 
far beyond what the CJEU appears to demand in its recent case law on international relations 
and access to documents.
2
 It also eclipses historical precedents in EU-US relations from the 
1990s.
3
 It is thus a broadly positive story from a legal and specifically EU law perspective in so 
far as it contributes positively to our understanding of the place of international relations in the 
supranational EU legal order.  
 
                                                           Institute for the Study of European Law (ISEL), The City Law School, City University London. Email: elaine.fahey.1@city.ac.uk. Thanks 
to the editors, Tamara Takacs and to participants at Leiden Law School conference in December 2015 for their stimulating remarks. 
1
 See Christina Eckes, Hoǁ the EuropeaŶ ParliaŵeŶt͛s partiĐipatioŶ iŶ iŶterŶatioŶal relatioŶs affeĐts the deep tissue of the EU͛s poǁer 
structures, 12 (4) I.CON 904, (2014).  
2
 See Merijn Chamon, The Institutional Balance, an Ill-Fated Principle of EU Law?, European Public Law, forthcoming.  
3
E.g. M. Pollack & G. Shaffer (eds.), Transatlantic Governance in the Global Economy (Rowman & Littlefield 2001); M. Pollack, The New 
Transatlantic Agenda at Ten: Reflections in an experiment in International Governance, 43 JCMS 899, (2005). 
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Section 1 explores briefly the negotiation of EU international agreements as a specific field of 
law. Section 2 considers generally how the TTIP negotiations overall contribute to the 
politicisation of the EU through shifts in legal practice on the part of all major institutional 
actors to EU international relations in changes to approach, procedure and actions. Section 3 
uses the notion of responsiveness to measure politicisation, considering the responses as 
actually practiced by institutional actors in law to normative concerns arising. It considers these 
practices specifically as an indication of politicisation across a range of actors, specifically the 
European Commission, the European Parliament, the Ombudsman, the Committee of the 
Regions and the TTIP Advisory Group.  
 
The negotiation of international agreements as a field of law  
It is striking that the process of the negotiation of international agreements is not viewed per se 
as a substantive area of administrative, global administrative law, public or even transnational 
law.
4
 The ŶegotiatioŶ of ŵultiple gloďal ͚ŵega ƌegioŶal deals͛ suĐh as the TTIP ŶeĐessitates a 
broader view of what is at stake and why. The ͚ŶittǇ gƌittǇ͛ of on-going international 
negotiations remains a veritable legal blind spot arguably because it is somehow a highly 
political step, even if hyper-legalised.  Accordingly, the new mega-regional negotiation era does 
not necessarily fit so well within existing analytical perspectives.  
 
As Eeckhout states, as a matter of EU law, the subject matter of the procedures surrounding the 
ŶegotiatioŶ, ĐoŶĐlusioŶ aŶd teƌŵiŶatioŶ of aŶ iŶteƌŶatioŶal agƌeeŵeŶt is ͚a teƌse aŶd self-
referential legal suďjeĐt͛.5 The EU͛s ŶegotiatioŶ of iŶteƌŶatioŶal agƌeeŵeŶts is Ŷot aŶ aƌea 
where traditionally legitimacy, normative or participation concerns have enjoyed a specific 
place.
6
 The new role of the EP, including its new information rights, is an important normative 
concern of the post-Lisbon era.
7
 Yet post-Lisbon debates are still some stretch away from 
grander debates on inter alia, paƌtiĐipatioŶ, Điǀil soĐietǇ aŶd the gloďal ͚otheƌs͛ affeĐted ďǇ suĐh 
                                                          
4
  See Eyal BeŶǀeŶisti, ͚DeŵoĐƌaĐǇ Captuƌed: The Mega-‘egioŶal AgƌeeŵeŶts aŶd the Futuƌe of Gloďal PuďliĐ Laǁ͛ GlobalTrust Working 
Paper Series 08/2015. 
5
 See Piet Eeckhout EU External Relations Law (2
nd
 ed., OUP 2011), 193; cf Robert Schütze European Constitutional Law (2
nd
 ed., Cambridge 
University Press 2015), 284-286, 285. 
6
 Eeckhout, ibid; Deirdre Curtin, Official Secrets and the Negotiation of International Agreements: is the EU Executive Unbound?, 50 
CMLRev, 423, (2013);  
7
 E.g. ElaiŶe FaheǇ, ͚EU FoƌeigŶ ‘elatioŶs Laǁ: LitigatiŶg to IŶĐite OpeŶŶess iŶ EU NegotiatioŶs͛ European Journal of Risk Regulation 553, 
4/2014. 
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agreements.
8
 Negotiation is arguably also still viewed in highly formalist term even within the 
recent international relations case law of the CJEU. 
 
The TTIP negotiations as an architectural infrastructure of itself must be said to be legally and 
ĐoŶstitutioŶallǇ Ƌuite ͚eǆĐeptioŶalist͛ iŶ so faƌ as the wording of Article 218 TFEU does not 
necessarily envisage any sort of institutionalised infrastructure or structured apparatus along 
the lines of the TTIP negotiations. Similarly, the emerging post-Lisbon case law on institutional 
balance in international relations law does not provide any indication as to the contours of the 
evolution of the TTIP. This raises the question- how organic can and should specific actors be in 
response to the TTIP negotiations and how should we understand change?
9
 
 
As a result, there is much merit in focussing upon our understanding of negotiations and the 
limitations of contemporary understandings of negotiation through law. The account thus turns 
next to the specific narrative which this account develops as to the TTIP negotiations as 
politicisation, prior to considering the responsiveness of the various actors involved in the 
negotiations in the form of new legal practices and shifts through and by law.  
 
Shifts in EU international relations law- practice as politicisation 
On Politicisation and the EU 
The TTIP negotiations appear to have generated substantial fears at national and EU levels, as to 
the transfer of authority to a new living entity as a form of global governance.
10
  The current 
level of delegation of authority to entities beyond the State continues to rise exponentially and 
is charted to a considerable range of empirical and theoretical work.
11
 Politicisation beyond the 
Nation State is regarded as a forceful and effective antidote to normative concerns about the 
rise of the delegation of authority beyond the Nation State.
12
 Politicisation is defined here as 
the process by which decision-making is brought into the political space. It involves making 
                                                          
8
 Benevenisiti, supra, n.4. 
9
 See Marija Bartl & Elaine FaheǇ, ͚A Post NatioŶal ŵaƌketplaĐe? NegotiatiŶg the TƌaŶsatlaŶtiĐ Tƌade aŶd IŶǀestŵeŶt PaƌtŶeƌship iŶ ElaiŶe 
Fahey and Deirdre Curtin (eds.), A Transatlantic Community of Law: Legal Perspectives on the Relationship between the EU and US legal 
orders (Cambridge University Press 2014), Ch. 9. 
10
 E.g. Ferdi De Ville & Gabriel Siles-Brugge, TTIP: The Truth about the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. (Polity, 2015); 
Marise Cremona, Guest Editorial: Negotiating the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), 52 CMLRev 351, (2015). 
11
 E.g. Gary Marks & Liesbet Hooghe, Delegation and Pooling in International Organizations, 10 Review of International Organizations 305-
328 (2015). In a broader context, see for example Saskia Sassen, Globalisation or Denationalisation, 10  Review of International Political 
Economy 1, (2003). 
12
 Michael Zürn, Opening up Europe: next steps in politicisation research, 39(1) West European Politics, 16-82 (2016); Michael Zürn, The 
politicization of world politics and its effects: Eight propositions 6(1) European Political Science Review 47, (2014). 
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collectively binding decisions a matter or subject of public discussion.
13
 Politicisation involves 
͚daǇ light͛ ďeiŶg ďƌought upoŶ politiĐal deĐisioŶs.14 It has been argued that the day to day 
politics of the EU in recent times, be it from the euro crisis to the migration crisis, has begun 
steadily to politicise the EU.
15
 While the management of these crises may well have other valid 
analytical frames and critiques, this paper draws upon broader politicisation trends within the 
EU as evidence of wider similar change. It is thus a context of positive change. Politicisation may 
have the downside of constraining the negotiator through the information balance between the 
parties. However, this is far from certain or proven as a hypothesis within the TTIP negotiations 
so far.
16
  
 
The next section charts the general changes in approach, procedures and action on the part of 
EU institutional actors that TTIP has incited. These actions thus involve international relations 
being brought into the public domain, through transparency, debate or through engagement, 
prerequisites of politicisation, which are sketched here next. 
 
On politicisation and the TTIP 
There have been many remarkable specific acts of politicisation as regards decision-making that 
are argued to be identifiable within the TTIP negotiation processes largely conducted through 
shifts in legal practice. As regards the European Parliament (EP), the TTIP negotiations are 
aƌgued heƌe to haǀe ͚foƌŵallǇ͛ politiĐised the EP usiŶg laǁ as a ŵediuŵ. The TTIP has foƌĐed 
internal policy shifts and has created political cleavages within the EP as to the legal framework 
of the TTIP, discussed further below.  Certain MEPs have even openly breached the law by 
illegally leaking the negotiating documents in violation of confidentiality regulations, thereby 
acting in defiance of the Member States and EU institutions, so as to procure transparency.
17
  
 
As regards the Council, over one year after the adoption of the TTIP negotiation directives, the 
Council finally declassified the already leaked documents and thus changed its legal position 
originally adopted.
18
 This followed extensive critique at national parliamentary and EP level of 
the official secrecy surrounding the directives. It was a very tardy but nonetheless marked a sea 
                                                          
13
 Zürn, ibid, 2014, 50. 
14
 This paper does not consider or develop the full consequences of this thesis albeit that it is often understood to involve the hollowing 
out of national democracy. 
15
 Zürn, 2014, supra, n.12. 
16
 E.g. see Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt , Exploring the TTIP Transparency Paradox, forthcoming.  
17
 Chƌistoph HeƌƌŵaŶŶ, ͚Transleakancy͛ iŶ C HeƌƌŵaŶŶ, B Siŵŵa & ‘ StƌeiŶz ;eds.Ϳ, Tƌade PoliĐǇ ďetǁeeŶ Laǁ, DiploŵaĐǇ aŶd SĐholaƌship 
– Liber amicorum in memoriam Horst G. Krenzler European Yearbook of International Economic Law 39, (2015). See his detailed 
exposition of this at circa p. 39.  
18
 http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-11103-2013-DCL-1/en/pdf   Brussels, 9 October 2014 11103/13 DCL 1 Declassified 
on 9 October 2014: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/145014.pdf (accessed 24 Feb. 2016). 
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change in the transparency of the documents of EU international relations law, whereby the 
mere listing of EU interests no longer deemed worthy of secrecy.
19
 These acts of publication 
marked a step change well beyond recent case law of the CJEU on the international relations 
exceptions to transparency.
20
 
 
As regards the European Council, its direct incitement in its Conclusions for political dialogue to 
begin in the Member States on the TTIP, especially vis-à-vis civil society, is notable.21 Although 
non-binding, its Conclusions carry increasing legal significance for the EU͛s legislatiǀe pƌoĐess, 
particularly during the crisis.
22
  The TTIP is remarkable to the extent that it is hard to say when 
the Meŵďeƌ States haǀe pƌeǀiouslǇ ďeeŶ iŶĐited to ͚aĐtiǀise͛ theiƌ doŵestiĐ politiĐal 
constituencies in such a fashion in respect of EU foreign affairs.
23
 Politicisation through the TTIP 
heƌe appeaƌs to ĐhalleŶge the ͚ďehiŶd-the-dooƌs͛ logiĐ of EU iŶteƌŶatioŶal ƌelatioŶs deĐisioŶ-
making.
24
 
 
As regards other bodies outside of the EU institutions, the TTIP negotiations have also 
͚politiĐised͛ eŶtities oƌ ageŶĐies iŶ foƌeigŶ affaiƌs, pƌeǀiouslǇ oŶlǇ ŵeƌe sub-units of the larger 
political process without an express mandate in international relations (e.g. Committee of the 
Regions, Ombudsman and organised civil society). As will be developed here further below, 
these bodies have notably insisted upon more input, participation and openness in the TTIP 
negotiations. Civil society in particular appears increasingly politicised through law. For 
example, the gathering of 3,284,289 million signatories for a European Citizens Initiative (ECI) 
on the TTIP, from a range of Member States, is argued here to have marked an important step 
in the mobilisation of ordinary citizens against the TTIP itself as an act of politicisation through 
activist networks and NGOs, expressing transnational protest.
25
 Although the ECI was ultimately 
rejected for ostensibly procedural reasons,
26
 a new ECI, supported by the President of the 
European, STOP TTIP AND CETA with 3,404,467 signatories at the time of writing, is now 
pending. It provides further evidence of ongoing politicisation through law. 
                                                          
19
 Curtin, supra, n.6. 
20
 E.g. Case C-350/12 P Council of the European Union v SophieiŶ ͛t Veld, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2039; Vigjilenca Abazi & Martijn Hillebrandt, The 
Legal Limits to Confidential Negotiations: Recent Case Law Developments in Council Transparency: Access Info Europe and iŶ ͚t Veld (2015) 
52 CMLRev 825. 
21
 European Council Conclusions EUCO 11/15 (19-20 March 2015). 
22
 See Uwe Puetter, The European Council and the Council. New intergovernmentalism and institutional change (Oxford University Press 
2014); Chris Bickerton, European Integration: From Nation-States to Member States (Oxford University Press 2012); Deirdre Curtin, 
Challenging Executive Dominance in European Democracy, 77(1) MLR, 1 (2014). 
23
 TTIP has also been placed on the agenda of national elections, for example, in Germany.  
24
 H De Waele ͚StƌaiŶed AĐtoƌŶess – The ͚Neǁ͛ EuƌopeaŶ CouŶĐil iŶ TheoƌǇ aŶd PƌaĐtiĐe͛ iŶ ElaiŶe FaheǇ ;ed.Ϳ, The Actors of Postnational 
Rule-Making: Contemporary Challenges of EU and Public International Law (Routledge 2015). 
25
 https://stop-ttip.org/the-eci-result-in-numbers/ (accessed 24 Feb. 2016); Commission Delegated Regulation EU 1070/2015.  
26
 See https://stop-ttip.org/sign/(accessed 24 Feb. 2016).  
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These actions, practices and procedures have thus brought TTIP within the public domain, in a 
manner in which international relations was not previously. This thesis of politicisation still 
requires further development for its measurement through law, which this account next turns.  
 
On responsiveness as a measure of politicisation 
Overview 
A major feature of politicisation is the ability to chart change or progress and explicitly identify 
shifts or changes in practice. Accordingly, one key indicator of international politicisation of 
much significance to the present account is the responsiveness of international institutions to 
societal demands.
27
 Responsiveness is the ability to respond quickly or appropriately.
28
 
Responsiveness involves strategically applying instruments in a manner which is flexible and 
sensitive to behaviour, attitude and culture, environments, regimes, regulatory priorities 
challenges and objectives and is a core principle of regulation.
29
 While regulation theory is 
about choices faced in practice, international negotiations share a commonality in so far as 
actors choose directions and face new pressures- and change accordingly. Responsiveness 
contributes to politicisation in so far as institutional change is sought as part of politicisation 
demands.
30
 The aĐtoƌs ŵaǇ Ŷot ďe ͚sǇŵŵetƌiĐallǇ͛ aligŶed ďeĐause ƌespoŶsiǀeŶess ŵaǇ feed 
directly or indirectly into politicisation. Nonetheless, the staggering array of changes to the TTIP 
negotiation process are themselves reactions from actors through innovation, establishing new 
procedures; forums and practices have been established that never existed before, often 
beyond the requirements of CJEU case law on EU international relations law.
31
 Such 
responsiveness acts as the empirics of politicisation because they provide evidence of change 
precisely because they are measurable changes.  
 
The paper next delves more deeply into the specifics and explores the practices evolved by 
various actors within the TTIP negotiations: namely: (1) the European Commission, (2) the 
European Parliament, (3) the European Ombudsman, (4) the Committee of the Regions and (5) 
the AdǀisoƌǇ Gƌoup. It ďƌieflǇ outliŶes the salieŶt featuƌes of eaĐh of the aĐtoƌs͛ ƌoles iŶ 
international relations and then steps taken by the actors in response to the negotiations.  
                                                          
27
 Zürn, supra, n.12 58. 
28
 I.e. reacting in a desired or positive way or quick to react or respond. 
29
 See Julia Black and Robert Baldwin, Really Responsive Risk-Based Regulation, 32 Law and Policy 181 (2010). 
30
 Zürn, supra, n.12, 60. 
31
 See Alec Stone Sweet, Wayne Sandholtz & Neil Fligstein (eds.), The Institutionalization of Europe (Oxford University Press 2001).  
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On responsiveness practices and the European Commission   
Pursuant to Article 218 TFEU, the Council can but need not necessarily authorise the European 
Commission (Commission) to be the Union negotiator for an agreement.
32
 Nevertheless, as 
Eeckhout suggests, the negotiation of international agreements in the past has been a 
significant Commission prerogative.
33
 The Commission is also said to vacillate between 
autonomy and delegation of powers in its negotiations, externally with third countries and 
internally with the Council.
34
 The Commission is arguably the most normatively salient actor in 
the TTIP negotiations from an EU perspective because it has principally been responsible for 
evolving a vast infrastructure of practices.  
 
OsteŶsiďlǇ, the ƌeĐeŶt Đase laǁ of the CJEU has Ŷot ŶeĐessaƌilǇ stƌeŶgtheŶed the CoŵŵissioŶ͛s 
hand in international relations negotiations, i.e. specifically during the negotiation process. For 
example, the recent decision of the CJEU in Commission v. Council (Greenhouse Gas Emissions) 
appears to require both autonomy for the Commission qua negotiator but also considerable 
aĐĐouŶtaďilitǇ as ďetǁeeŶ the CoŵŵissioŶ aŶd the CouŶĐil͛s speĐial Đommittee in 
negotiations.
35
 It thus outlines a modest and balanced vision of Commission autonomy in 
negotiations. There, the Commission sought annulment of a Council Decision authorising the 
opening of an EU emissions trading scheme with Australia for its alleged infringement of the 
principle of sincere cooperation and institutional balance in Article 13 TEU. It argued principally 
that the Commission as negotiator could not be bound by the negotiating Directives which 
established detailed negotiating positions for reason of the silence of the treaties.  The CJEU 
agreed that the Council lacked powers to bind the Commission whilst simultaneously also 
emphasising its accountability to the Council. While this goes well beyond previous case law 
(albeit based on previous provisions in the early 1990s and at a later stage of conclusion of a 
treaty), for example, in France v. Commission
36
 (where France successfully challenged the 
authority of the Commission to autonomously claim power to bind itself to an international 
agreement with the United States), it is not so far-reaching because it gives little indication of 
the change that the Commission has spear-headed in the TTIP negotiations.  
 
                                                          
32
 See Eeckhout and Schütze, supra, n.5. 
33
 Eeckhout, supra, 197, n.5. 
34
 Schütze, supra, n. 5.  
35
 Case C-425/13, Commission v. Council, ECLI:EU:C:2015:483. 
36
 Case C-327/91 France v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1994:305. 
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In this regard, the amount and quantity of transparency and participation that the Commission 
as lead negotiator has sought to apply to the TTIP by the 13
th
 round of negotiations is very far-
reaching in contrast to such case law and recent EP transparency case law. The TTIP 
ŶegotiatioŶs ĐoŶtƌast shaƌplǇ ǁith the CoŵŵissioŶ͛s ƌeaĐtioŶs in the negotiation of Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), where it had to quickly respond and combat myths 
with documents and fact sheets, which ultimately failed to convince the EP.
37
 A landmark 
operational agreement was thus entered into in December 2015 whereby the Commission 
provided the EP all consolidated texts and other sensitive TTIP documents.
38
  The TTIP 
negotiations after 13 rounds of negotiations and multiple rounds of information disclosures 
appear far more institutionalised and sophisticated in their attitude to transparency. They thus 
staŶd sigŶifiĐaŶtlǇ apaƌt fƌoŵ its ACTA ͚kŶee-jeƌk͛ ƌespoŶsiǀeŶess, ĐoŶsideƌaďlǇ ŵoƌe liŵited 
temporally and thus once-off, with limited inter-institutional impact. This is because it has 
generated a wholly different dialogue, textual format and a more meaningful form of 
iŶfoƌŵatioŶ pƌoǀisioŶ. TheǇ thus ŵaƌk a ŵajoƌ shift iŶ the CoŵŵissioŶ͛s tƌaŶspaƌeŶĐǇ 
practices.
39
 
 
The TTIP negotiations also appear to have generated a specific accountability dynamic around 
the Commission to inter alia the Ombudsman, the EP, citizens, States, the Council and even the 
newly established Advisory Group (discussed below) has driven its programme of 
responsiveness.
40
 Its ability to propose large-scale global reforms e.g. the Investment Court 
System (ICS), as a means to address broad-reaching concerns on Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement (ISDS), forms also an important example of far-reaching responsiveness practices on 
its part as a means to garner more public support through legal change and holding itself to 
account as lead negotiator.
41
 The TTIP negotiations have thus incited considerably 
responsiveness practices on the part of the Commission.  
 
                                                          
37
 See Christina Eckes, Elaine Fahey & Machiko Kanetake, International, European and US Perspectives on the Negotiation and Adoption of 
the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), XX(2) Currents, 20 (2012); Cremona, supra, n. 10. 
38
 Pursuant to annex II, point 2.3, Framework Agreement on relations between the EP and European Commission (20 November 2010 OJ L 
304/ 57); Letter from Cecilia Malmströŵ ͚AĐĐess to TTIP-related documents- comprehensive agreement on operational agreements 
ďetǁeeŶ the INTO Coŵŵittee aŶd DG Tƌade͛ D ϯϮϭϰϴϱ ϭϬ DeĐeŵďeƌ ϮϬϭϱ.  
39
 See Abazi and Hilldebrant, supra, n.20; Curtin, supra, n. 6. 
40
 See PolitiĐo, ͚Softer secrecy deal foƌ TTIP gƌoup͛ ;ϲ JaŶuaƌǇ ϮϬϭϱͿ:  http://www.politico.eu/article/softer-secrecy-deal-for-ttip-group/ 
(accessed 24 Feb. 2016). 
41
 EuƌopeaŶ CoŵŵissioŶ CoŶĐept papeƌ ͚Investment in TTIP and beyond – the path for reform. Enhancing the right to regulate and moving 
froŵ ĐurreŶt ad hoĐ arďitratioŶ toǁards aŶ IŶǀestŵeŶt Court͛, 5 May 2015.  
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On responsiveness practices and the EP  
Moving on to another significant actor, the EP, the history of the powers of the EP in 
international relations is one of modest and gradual empowerment.
42
 Post-Lisbon, the EP has 
powers of consent to approve international agreements in a variety of circumstances, pursuant 
to Article 218(6)(a) TFEU.
43
 They are nevertheless limited to modest information and veto rights 
ameliorated through an agreement. The European Parliament is still excluded from the critical 
stage of the opening of negotiations on international relations agreements in Article 218(3) 
TFEU.
44
  The legal role of the EP as to the TTIP principally relates to its information rights and its 
eventual consent to the final result. However, its non-binding resolutions increasingly carry legal 
significance, especially with the US through resolutions,
45
 iŶdiĐatiŶg its politiĐisatioŶ ͚outǁaƌds 
iŶ͛.46  
 
The empowerment of the EP as a legal actor in international relations to some extent has been 
strengthened in recent CJEU case law. In iŶ ͛t Veld, the CJEU has recently eroded important 
international relations exceptions to the transparency regulation in response to litigation taken 
ďǇ aŶ iŶdiǀidual MEP, Sophie iŶ ͛t Veld.47  The principle of inter-institutional balance has also 
been applied to it with much force in Parliament v. Council ;͚EU-Mauƌitius͛), on its late 
information provided to the EP about of an agreement between the EU and Mauritius already 
puďlished iŶ the OJ as a ďƌeaĐh of the EP͛s deŵoĐƌatiĐ ƌights uŶdeƌ AƌtiĐle Ϯϭϴ TFEU, ƌesultiŶg iŶ 
its annulment.
48
 However, it might be contrasted with European Parliament v. Council 
;͚Euƌopol͛Ϳ, ǁheƌe the EP ƌeĐeŶtlǇ failed iŶ its effoƌt to allege pƌoĐeduƌal iŵpƌopƌietǇ iŶ the 
Council decision listing third countries that Europol could engage in agreements with, by 
arguing that it was a political choice that it needed to influence.
49 Thus, a standard line of 
reasoning has not yet emerged. 
 
In July 2015, the EP passed a significant resolution on the TTIP.
50
 Although non-binding under 
the treaties, it was obtained after a series of important and remark-worthy delays. On the first 
                                                          
42
 See DaŶiel ThǇŵ, ͚PaƌliaŵeŶtaƌǇ IŶǀolǀeŵeŶt iŶ EuƌopeaŶ IŶteƌŶatioŶal ‘elatioŶs͛ iŶ M CƌeŵoŶa and B De Witte (eds.), EU Foreign 
Relations Law: Constitutional Foundations (Hart Publishing 2008) pp. 201-231; 210. 
43
 Article 218(6)(a)(v) TFEU.  
44
 See Eeckhout, supra, n. 5, 199. 
45
 See D Jančić, ͚The Role of the European Parliament and the US Congress in Shaping Transatlantic Relations: TTIP, NSA Surveillance and 
CIA ‘eŶditioŶs͛, Journal of Common Market Studies (forthcoming). 
46
 See Eckes, supra, n. 1. 
47
 IŶ ͛t ǀeld, supra, n.20. 
48
 C-658/11, Parliament v. Council, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2025.  
49
 C-363/1z4, European Parliament v. Council, ECLI:EU:C:2015:579 
50
 EuƌopeaŶ PaƌliaŵeŶt ƌesolutioŶ of ϴ JulǇ ϮϬϭϱ ĐoŶtaiŶiŶg the EuƌopeaŶ PaƌliaŵeŶt͛s ƌeĐoŵŵeŶdatioŶs to the EuƌopeaŶ CoŵŵissioŶ on 
the negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) (2014/2228(INI)). 
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of these, the decision to postpone discussion of a resolution passed by 183 votes to 181 with 37 
abstentions.  The President of the EP ǁas ĐoŶdeŵŶed iŶ ŵedia ƌepoƌts foƌ usiŶg ͚aŶ 
underhanded͛ adŵiŶistƌatiǀe pƌoĐeduƌe to postpoŶe the ǀote ďǇ the EP oŶ the TTIP as a ͚ƌuse͛ 
to cover up sharp divisions within two large political groups on the rightful place of ISDS.
51
 The 
EP resolution finally passed on 8 July 2015 displays considerable political prevarication.
52
 For 
example, its resolution was perceived to be particularly ambiguous in terms of its political place: 
supporting the TTIP but rejecting ISDS albeit not unequivocally, by 436 to 241.
53
 Shortly 
thereafter, it was reported in September to have overwhelmingly supported Investment Court 
System (ICS) reforms and continues to do so.
54
   
 
The EP shows many further shifts in practice through responsiveness. In response to the 
CouŶĐil͛s failure to publish the negotiation mandate, with MEPs initially individually leaking 
documents. More broadly, however, during the 12 rounds of negotiation, the EP has 
consistently acted as a transparency champion, lauding Commission, European Council and 
Ombudsman efforts at transparency, going well beyond the strict contours of recent CJEU case 
law, for example, in iŶ ͚t Veld. However, its responsiveness to broader normative concerns, for 
example, as to democratic, legitimacy or other significant concerns in the development of TTIP, 
is arguably not so homogenous. Instead, in the TTIP negotiations the EP has displayed high 
levels of politicisation and stronger interest cleavages or divides. The TTIP negotiations give 
strong evidence of outwards-in pressures. Arguably, its responsiveness has been more muted 
while its politicisation appears intensified. Nevertheless, the EP here appears to act as a subject 
or agent of politicisation in the broader sense through its organisation of political protest 
beyond that envisaged in current case law.   
 
 
3.4: On responsiveness and the European Ombudsman 
The European Ombudsman (Ombudsman) is the next important reference point for shifts in 
inter-iŶstitutioŶal pƌaĐtiĐe. ‘eĐeŶt studies deŵoŶstƌate ĐoŶǀiŶĐiŶg hoǁ ͚ƌepƌiŵaŶds͛ fƌoŵ the 
Ombudsman to other institutions generally modify EU practice positively and increase EU 
accountability.
55
 The TTIP negotiations are argued here to mark an important recent example of 
                                                          
51
 EUObserver ͚MEPs sŶipe at oŶe aŶotheƌ, as US tƌade ǀote postpoŶed͛ ;ϵ JuŶe ϮϬϭϱͿ. 
52
 EUObserver ͚MEPs ďaĐk US fƌee tƌade afteƌ soĐialist U-tuƌŶ͛ ;Ϯϴ MaǇ ϮϬϭϱͿ. 
53
 Euractiv, ͚EuƌopeaŶ PaƌliaŵeŶt ďaĐks TTIP, ƌejeĐts ISDS͛ ;ϵ JulǇ ϮϬϭϱͿ; EUObserver ͚MEPs sŶipe at oŶe aŶotheƌ, as US tƌade ǀote 
postpoŶed͛ ;ϵ JuŶe ϮϬϭϱͿ. 
54
 See the recent account on political positions in EUObserver ͚TTIP iŶǀestoƌ Couƌt illegal saǇ GeƌŵaŶ judges͛ ;ϰ FeďƌuaƌǇ ϮϬϭϲͿ. 
55
 See Petia Kostadinova, Improving the Transparency and Accountability of EU Institutions: The Impact of the Office of the European 
Ombudsman, 53 JCMS 1077, (2015). 
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this. Despite significant legislative exclusions existing in Council Regulation 1049/2001 (EC) on 
access to documents so as to limit her conduct in foreign affairs, she launched an important 
own-initiative inquiry into the Commissions conduct of the TTIP negotiations.
56
 Thus, the 
Ombudsman raised a broad range of concerns in July 2014, a year into the negotiations, as to 
the failures to discover key documents, delays, granting privileged access to certain types of 
stakeholdeƌs ďut also ƌaised ͚softeƌ͛ aĐĐouŶtaďilitǇ ƋuestioŶs as to the leaƌŶiŶg pƌoĐess of the 
TTIP, mirroring concerns raised by the EP and civil society.
57
 Her inquiry ostensibly concluded in 
January 2015 raised 10 suggestions including, inter alia, to be proactive in providing 
information, negotiation texts and making meetings transparent with negotiators. It resulted in 
a detailed follow up and response, which amounts to an important tale of positive practice in 
developing openness in negotiations.
58
 It has proven to be a positive learning process in so far 
as the Ombudsman herself eǀeŶtuallǇ ďeĐoŵes a ĐhaŵpioŶ of the CoŵŵissioŶs͛ 
uŶpƌeĐedeŶted͛ aŶd ͚ƌeal͛ effoƌts to pƌoŵote puďliĐ paƌtiĐipatioŶ.59  
 
Her actions demonstrate some breadth of the interpretation of her role – pushing the 
boundaries of her function which might not have previously been understood to capture foreign 
relations, excluded as it is from EU transparency law. One might note that the Ombudsman has 
recently also sought to apply transparency to the governance arrangements surrounding the 
transfer of data under the EU-US (Swift) Terrorist Financial Tracking Programme (TFTP) - with 
considerably less success than as to TTIP.
60
 Ironically, this failure appears to have arisen from 
the formal legal limits of her role, i.e. her inability to obtain permission for access from the US. 
 
Her actions in TTIP demonstrate a specific responsiveness to the public concerns arising as to 
TTIP, achieving legal results in line with recent studies of the Office.
61
 The information 
generated by the Ombudsman in her TTIP inquiry amounts to important legal empowerment for 
other actors, e.g. the EP,
62
 which can feed more broadly into politicisation activities of the EP.  
                                                          
56
 Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European 
Parliament;  Transparency of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, Decision of 6 January 2015: 
http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/cases/summary.faces/en/58670/html.bookmark (accessed 24 Feb. 2016); Follow up of European 
Commission and the reply of the Ombudsman: 
http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/cases/correspondence.faces/en/59898/html.bookmark (accessed 24 Feb. 2016); Decision of 2 
September 2014 http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/cases/decision.faces/en/54678/html.bookmark (accessed 24 Feb. 2016). 
57
 Access to documents of the institutions and decision of the European Ombudsman of 6 January 2015 closing her own initiative inquiry 
O1/10/2014/RA concerning the European Commission on dealing with requests for information and access to documents (Transparency). 
58
 Supra, n.56. 
59
 See ͚CoŵŵeŶts to CoŵŵissioŶ oŶ oǁŶ-iŶitiatiǀe iŶƋuiƌǇ͛ ‘EF Ϭϭ/ϭϬ/ϮϬϭϰ ‘I. 
60
 See http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/cases/summary.faces/en/57623/html.bookmark (accessed 24 Feb. 2016).  
61
 Kostadinova, supra, n. 55.  
62
 See Paul Craig EU Administrative Law (2
nd
 ed., Oxford University Press 2012), 357. 
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The work of the Ombudsman is thus important in characterising responsiveness of other 
institutional actors in the negotiations.  
 
On responsiveness and the Committee of the Regions  
Moving on next to other non-institutional actors, namely the Committee of the Regions (CotR), 
it appears to have acted as a form of subject or agent of politicisation within the TTIP 
negotiation, albeit of a lesser sort. The CotR is an advisory body of the EU pursuant to Article 
300 TFEU, comprised of regional and local elected representatives and provides opinions where 
consulted by the institutions. The CotR entity has delivered some interesting interventions in 
the TTIP negotiations, albeit it can at most make non-binding recommendations.
63
 The CotR is 
not necessarily or usually associated with EU foreign affairs because there is no formal 
infrastructure for EU external action with respect to sub-national actors. It is often an entity 
peƌĐeiǀed ǁith soŵe sĐeptiĐisŵ as to its politiĐal salieŶĐe iŶ ͚ƌeal ǁoƌld͛ politiĐs.64 The political 
influence of the Committee has only recently become the object of formal study and its legal 
influence similarly remains embryonic.
65
 Some have sought to enhance the mandate and role of 
the CotR specifically in EU-US relations by way of a multi-level legitimation of EU structures, 
seeing the global as local.
66
  
 
In its draft opinion on the TTIP of 11-13 February 2015, the CotR criticised the delay in the 
publication of the TTIP negotiating mandate several months after it was leaked online.
67
 The 
CotR has also sought to emphasise the significance of multi-level democracy and the place of 
the regions within the national parliaments that would eventually get to vote upon TTIP going 
forward. The CotR is rarely associated with international relations, lacking an express mandate 
in this field, and its intervention marks an important incitement towards politicisation sparked 
by the TTIP. It is worth recalling that the outputs of international institutions are less likely to be 
rubberstamped at national level where international politicisation is increased. The voice of 
multi-layered democracy in this context appears thus of significance. 
 
                                                          
63
 Zürn, supra, n. 12. 
64
 See Nikos Skoutaris ͚Comparing the subnational constitutional space of the European sub-state eŶtities iŶ the aƌea of foƌeigŶ affaiƌs͛ 4(2) 
Perspectives on Federalism, E239-E268, (2012). 
65
 See Christian Hönnige & Diana Panke, The Committee of the Regions and the European Economic and Social Committee: How Influential 
are Consultative Committees in the European Union?, 51 Journal of Common Market Studies 452, (2013); Josephine VaŶ )eďeŶ iŶ ͚A 
͚Bottoŵ-Up͛ PeƌspeĐtiǀe oŶ EU-US Relations: The Role of Sub-CeŶtƌal Authoƌities͛ in Fahey and Curtin, supra, n.9. 
66
 Van Zeben, ibid.  
67
 See http://cor.europa.eu/en/news/Pages/ttip-potential.aspx (last accessed 24 Feb. 2016).  
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On responsiveness and the Advisory Group  
The final actor of note considered here as to the TTIP negotiations is the Advisory Group as the 
body established after 3 rounds of negotiations to formally represent civil society, albeit as a 
non-institutional actor of EU law. Thus, a TTIP Advisory Group was established in January 2014, 
after 3 rounds of negotiations. It was specifically designed to combat critique as to the 
privileged place of the corporate world within the TTIP negotiations aŶd also to pƌoǀide ͚high 
ƋualitǇ adǀiĐe͛ ǁithiŶ the talks aŶd thus deepeŶ the CoŵŵissioŶs͛ ĐoŵŵitŵeŶt to dialogue ǁith 
all stakeholders.
68
 The Advisory Group is additional to stakeholder meetings and civil society 
dialogues which at the time of its composition had already engaged in consultation with over 
ϱϬϬ eŶtities. The AdǀisoƌǇ Gƌoup is Đoŵpƌised of ϭϰ ŵeŵďeƌs, dƌaǁŶ fƌoŵ ĐoŶsuŵeƌs͛ 
interests, labour law, environment, health, business, manufacturing, agriculture and services 
sectors. Arguably, their selection was not necessarily wholly transparent.
69
 The Commission was 
reported to have watered down the non-disĐlosuƌe agƌeeŵeŶt ƌeƋuiƌed of the gƌoup͛s 
members, after concerns that the Commission had reacted excessively in response to leaking 
linked to the group. However, it subsequently was compelled to remove clauses which would 
have precluded the Group from speaking to the media, demonstrating clear shifts in 
Commission practice in its favour.
70
 Moreover, the Ombudsman in her TTIP decision in 2015 
advocated greater access to the consolidated texts for the Advisory Group, thereby acting as an 
advocate of its interests. 
 
The Group at the time of writing was about to hold its 22
nd
 meeting (5 April 2016) and appears 
to have functioned along the lines of hearing presentations from the Commission and engaging 
in a question and answer session with the EU negotiator. One specific issue is the extent to 
which such a group functions beyond merely advisory status and can function as a form of 
tangible check on the legal and normative limits of the TTIP. For example, the Advisory Group 
appears to have argued that ISDS should be severed from TTIP or at least referred to the CJEU 
as well as the formal relationship of the TTIP with the TPP or the scope of proposals (i.e. on the 
ICS) in its most recent responses at the time of writing. Overtime, contrasting the earliest with 
the latest meetings by late 2015, a considerable evolution takes place in terms of the reporting, 
the transparency and the level of engagement between the body and the Commission. The 
Gƌoup͛s iŶĐƌeasiŶglǇ ĐƌitiĐal ƋuestioŶs oƌ ƌeƋuests e.g. to seǀeƌ paƌts of the ŶegotiatioŶs oƌ to 
                                                          
68
 See EuƌopeaŶ CoŵŵissioŶ, ͚Eǆpeƌt gƌoup to adǀise EuƌopeaŶ CoŵŵissioŶ oŶ EU-US tƌade talks͛ ;Ϯϳ JaŶuaƌǇ ϮϬϭϰͿ.  
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-79_en.htm (accessed 24 Feb. 2016). 
69
 See Bartl and Fahey, supra, n.9; see for its detailed composition: 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/january/tradoc_152102.pdf (accessed 24 Feb. 2016). 
70
See the disclosure agreement: http://g8fip1kplyr33r3krz5b97d1.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/20150601-
Non-Disclosure-Agreement-TTIP.pdf (accessed 24 Feb. 2016).  
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refer parts to the CJEU present an interesting modus vivendi that warrant further scrutiny. 
Nevertheless, how meaningful and effective the group will be or has been can only be gauged at 
a later stage.  
 
 
Conclusions 
Although the legal dimensions of international negotiations is not uniformly well understood 
across disciplines, the TTIP negotiations provide evidence that it is rich terrain for legal and 
many other perspectives alike. The TTIP negotiations have altered and been re-constituted 
considerably through each round of negotiations and appear to provide evidence of positive 
changes each time. These positive changes represent the effects of international relations upon 
EU law. It has accordingly been argued that the negotiations provide important evidence of 
politicisation taking effect within the EU legal order through shifts in legal practices in the TTIP 
negotiations, bringing transparency, legitimacy and democracy to the fore. It is not yet evident 
ǁhat the doǁŶsides of this politiĐisatioŶ aƌe fƌoŵ a legal peƌspeĐtiǀe, e.g. ǁhetheƌ the EU͛s 
negotiating position has been legally constrained because of its commitments to transparency.  
 
The salience of the negotiations has been argued here to manifest specifically in 
͚ƌespoŶsiǀeŶess͛ thƌough oƌ ďǇ eŵpoǁeƌŵeŶt of aĐtoƌs ǁithiŶ the ŶegotiatioŶs. ‘espoŶsiǀeŶess 
has been argued here to be a useful measure for politicisation, showing reactions and change, 
particularly when viewed from a legal perspective.  Accordingly, the positive benefits of change 
and innovation on the part of so many institutional actors through law appears worthy of 
further consideration and reflection from a legal perspective.  
